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Abstract
Verifiable Outsourced Database Model: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Faryed Eltayesh
In the verifiable database (VDB) model, a computationally weak client (database owner) del-
egates his database management to a database service provider on the cloud, which is considered
untrusted third party, while users can query the data and verify the integrity of query results. Since
the process can be computationally costly and has a limited support for sophisticated query types
such as aggregated queries, we propose in this research a framework that helps bridge the gap be-
tween security and practicality. The proposed framework remodels the verifiable database problem
using Stackelberg security game. In the new model, the database owner creates and uploads to
the database service provider the database and its authentication structure (AS). Next, the game is
played between the defender (verifier), who is a trusted party to the database owner and runs sched-
uled randomized verifications using Stackelberg mixed strategy, and the database service provider.
The idea is to randomize the verification schedule in an optimized way that grants the optimal pay-
off for the verifier while making it extremely hard for the database service provider or any attacker
to figure out which part of the database is being verified next.
We have implemented and compared the proposed model performance with a uniform ran-
domization model. Simulation results show that the proposed model outperforms the uniform ran-
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This chapter introduces the research context, motivation, problem definition, research questions
that we aim to answer, and summary of contributions. We conclude this chapter with an overview
of the thesis organization.
1.1 Research Context
Database outsourcing has become one of the most attractive cloud computing services (Myk-
letun, Narasimha, & Tsudik, 2003; Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006; Xie, Wang, Yin, & Meng, 2007).
In the outsourced database (ODB) model, three entities are involved: the database owner, who is
considered to be a resource constraint client, database users who use and interact with the database,
and third-party database service provider. The database owner delegates his database management
to the database service provider, who provides mechanisms to enable the database owner and users
to create, update, and query the database as needed (Li, Hadjieleftheriou, Kollios, & Reyzin, 2006;
Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006; Wang, Chen, Huang, You, & Xiang, 2015). By outsourcing database
management to the cloud, organizations take advantage of all benefits cloud computing has to offer
including unlimited on-demand computational power in a pay-as-you-go basis (Goodrich, Tamassia,
& Triandopoulos, 2008; Wang et al., 2015; Zhang & Safavi-Naini, 2014).
Despite the enormous advantages ODB offers, database outsourcing poses serious data security
concerns (Chen, Li, Huang, Ma, & Lou, 2015; Zhu et al., 2013). Since data is a highly important
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asset to organizations and since it is stored outside the organization boundaries and control by
potentially untrusted third-party, data privacy and integrity become the most challenging issues
for organizations (Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006; Yuan & Yu, 2013). The database service provider
can be malicious or may not take sufficient security measures to protect the hosted data against
malicious insiders or outsiders (Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006; Thompson, Haber, Horne, Sander, &
Yao, 2009). Therefore, it is important to provide a mechanism to secure the outsourced data from
both a malicious database service provider or any malicious outsider (Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006).
In addition to data integrity assurance, the mechanism has to assure the completeness of data. Data
completeness ensures that the result set of any query is complete and that there was no data deleted
from the database in an unauthorized way (Wang et al., 2015).
1.2 Motivation
The integrity concerns of outsourced databases were the drive behind the emergence of the
verifiable databases (VDBs) (Goodrich et al., 2008; Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006; Yuan & Yu, 2013).
In the VDB model, the database owner creates and uploads to the database service provider on the
cloud the database and its special authentication structure (AS). Authentication structures are a type
of data structures that use cryptographic primitives such as digital signatures to sign the underlying
data and ensure its integrity. Next, when database users query the data, the database service provider
responds to users’ queries with the query results and a verification object (VO) extracted from the
AS. Finally, users can use the VO to ensure that integrity of data has not been violated. The process
of creating the AS and the verification uses cryptographic primitives such as digital signatures that
ensure the data has not been manipulated by anyone other than the authorized parties (Chen, Li,
Weng, Ma, & Lou, 2014; Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006; Wang et al., 2015).
Extensive research has been devoted in the last decades to solve the problem of VDB. However,
existing solutions are theoretical and they are impractical for real-world applications (Chen et al.,
2015; Li et al., 2006). The inefficiency originated from the costly computations required by existing
solutions making it impractical for resource-constraint clients (Li et al., 2006; Zhu et al., 2013).
Furthermore, the complex computations result in a limited support for sophisticated query types
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such as aggregated queries (Thompson et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2015).
1.3 Problem Definition
Most of the current solutions in the literature delegate the responsibility of the verification pro-
cess to database users. In this scenario, when database users receive the result set of any query they
send to the database service provider servers, they must perform the expensive verification process,
which may include a large number of decryption and hashing operations, for each record in the
result set.
Delegation of the verification process to database users suffers from four major limitations.
First, these approaches are unpractical when it comes to sophisticated queries such as aggregated
queries. This limitation is resulted from both the delegation of the expensive verification process
to database users and the complex authentication structure used to authenticate data. Second, these
approaches cannot be used in resource-constrained devices as the verification process is (computa-
tionally) expensive. Third, since database users only verify the data that they query, this poses a
security concern where any manipulated unused data may go undetected for a long time. Finally,
due to the weak separation of concerns in the design of the verification process , maintainability and
extensibility become an issue.
1.4 Research Questions
In our research, we aim to answer the following questions:
 How can we ideally decouple database users from the verification process in order to provide a
well structured separation of concerns design that would help overcome maintainability and
extensibility limitations as well as would provide support for sophisticated query types?
 Since the computationally expensive verification process cannot be performed all the time prac-
tically, is it feasible to use periodic randomized verifications to eliminate the expensive veri-
fication process while maintaining a sufficient security levels?
 Can we incorporate game theory to effectively optimize the verification process results?
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 Can we improve the performance further by tackling the methods of creating the authentication
structures and the performing the verification process?
1.5 Contributions
In this research, we aim to address the above-mentioned limitations associated with existing so-
lutions. Our work models the VDB security problem as a game theoretic problem using Stackelberg
game. Mainly, our Stackelberg security game is a leader-follower game played between the verifier
(leader), who is a trusted party to the database owner and the database service provider (follower).
The new model includes the following entities: the database owner, database users, the database ser-
vice provider, and the verifier. The database owner is responsible for creating the database special
authentication structure, which is stored along with the database at the database service provider
servers. The database service provider is responsible for hosting the database on the cloud and
providing access to the authorized database users. In addition, some of the processing operations
required for this model are performed at the database service provider side. Finally, the verifier is
a software component running scheduled verifications on-behalf of the database owner. Our model
provides both data integrity and completeness assurance. Furthermore, database users, who might
be resource-constraint clients, are not involved in the verification process. As a result, the proposed
model supports all query types and is easy to implement and integrate into existing systems. The
contribution this work is:
(1) Employing Stackelberg game theory to schedule periodic verifications to be run by the veri-
fier.
(2) Delegating the task of the verification process to a new entity called the verifier, who is a
trusted party to the database owner and runs scheduled verifications on-behalf of the database
owner, instead of database users.
(3) Introducing two stage verification process, namely the overall-table verification and the in-
depth table verification processes, to reduce computation and communication overhead.
4
1.6 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we introduce the background and
discuss the related work. In Chapter 3, we present a game theoretic analysis and design of the
proposed model. In Chapter 4, we cover the implementation settings and we evaluate the proposed




Background and Related Work
This chapter is composed of two main sections. The first section introduces the preliminary
concepts involved in the VDB model as well as game theory and Stackelberg game theory. The
second section covers the VDB and the use Stackelberg game in security state of the art research in
the literature.
2.1 Background
In this section, we define the preliminary building blocks of the verifiable database model in-
cluding one-way cryptographic hash functions, public-key digital signatures, aggregated digital sig-
natures, tow-party and three-party authentication model, Merkle hash tree, data correctness, and data
completeness. In addition, we present an overview of game theory and Stackelberg game theory.
2.1.1 One-Way Cryptographic Hash Functions
One-way hash function h(m) is a function that works in one direction by taking a message m
of any length and producing its unique fixed-length hash digest as shown in Figure 2.1. A secure
hash function must satisfy the following three conditions:
(1) Preimage-resistance which implies that given a hash digest h, it’s computationally infeasible
to find any message m such that h = h(m). In other words, given a hash digest, it’s compu-
tationally infeasible to find the original message that produced the hash digest (Rogaway &
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Figure 2.1: One-way hash function
Shrimpton, 2004).
(2) Second-preimage resistance which implies that given a message m and its hash digest h(m),
it’s computationally infeasible to find a second message m0 where m 6= m0 and h(m) =
h(m0). In other words, it’s infeasible to find a second message that produces the same hash
digest as another different message (Rogaway & Shrimpton, 2004).
(3) Collision resistance which implies that it’s computationally infeasible to find two different
messages m and m0 that produce the same hash digest (Rogaway & Shrimpton, 2004).
Hash functions are an important building block of verifiable databases because they help reduce
the communication and computation overhead. For instance, instead of signing a database record
of length 200 characters (1600 bits), we can hash this database record first and then we sign the
obtained hash digest of 256 bits length. The secure hash algorithm (SHA) family is an example of
hash functions (Pang, Zhang, & Mouratidis, 2009).
2.1.2 Public-Key Digital Signature Schemes
A public-key digital signature scheme is a mathematical scheme used to sign digital content
in order to verify the authenticity, origin, and integrity of the signed message. In this context, the
signer generates two keys, a public and a private key. The private key is kept secret and used to
sign the message. On the other hand, the public key is distributed to clients who need to verify the
signed message. RSA is an example of public-key digital signatures (Li et al., 2006; Pang et al.,
2009; Pointcheval & Stern, 2000; Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman, 1978).
A secure digital signature scheme must provide the following properties:
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Figure 2.2: Digital signature signing process
(1) Authenticity which implies that the signer, who possesses the secret key, has actually signed
the message (Pointcheval & Stern, 2000; Rivest et al., 1978).
(2) Unforgeability which implies that only the signer can generate a valid signature for the con-
cerned message (Pointcheval & Stern, 2000; Rivest et al., 1978).
(3) Non-re-usability which implies that a signature of one message can not be used to sign a
another message (Pointcheval & Stern, 2000; Rivest et al., 1978).
(4) Non-repudiation which implies that the signer can not deny the fact that a valid signed mes-
sage was in fact signed by him (Pointcheval & Stern, 2000; Rivest et al., 1978).
(5) Integrity which ensures that the content has not been modified after it was signed (Pointcheval
& Stern, 2000; Rivest et al., 1978).
Practically, digital signing is achieved using cryptographic encryption as well as cryptographic
hash functions. There are two phases involved which are the signing phase and the verification
phase. To illustrate the process, assume that we have data to be signed and then verified. To sign
the data, the first step is to hash the data using any secure cryptographic hash function such as SHA.
The result of the hashing process is the hash digest. Next, the signer uses his private key to encrypt
the obtained hash digest which produces a signature of the input data as shown in Figure 2.2.
To verify the integrity of signed data, the signer needs to distribute his public key to the party
concerned with the verification process first. In addition, the verifier party needs the signature and
the data itself to be able to complete the verification process as shown in Figure 2.3. First, the
verifier has to hash the received data. Second, the verifier decrypt the signature of the data. Finally
the verifier compares the two hash digests and detect any data integrity if they are not equal.
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Figure 2.3: Digital signature verification process
2.1.3 Aggregated Digital Signature
The aggregated digital signature scheme aggregates multiple digital signatures into one signa-
ture to reduce communication and computation overhead. The resulted aggregated signature can
be verified once instead of multiple verifications (Ma, Deng, Pang, & Zhou, 2005). This feature
can save a great deal of bandwidth and computations overhead specially when dealing with very
large databases. For instance, instead of sending signatures of 100 records from a database table,
these 100 signatures can be aggregated into only one signature with a size equals to the size of one
signature. Similarly, instead of verifying the 100 signature separately, the aggregated signature can
be verified once and for all the 100 signatures together.
2.1.4 Two-Party and Three-Party Authentication Models
There are two parties involved in the two-party authentication model, a client and untrusted
server. The client outsources his data management to the untrusted server. The server manages
the data and provides the client with the ability to update and query the data. Considering that
the server is untrusted, a mechanism to ensure that the data has not been manipulated has to be
implemented (Goodrich et al., 2008; Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006; Papamanthou & Tamassia, 2007).
Cryptographic primitives such as hash functions and digital signatures are used in this model to
facilitate the integrity authentication process. This model provides private verifiability in which
9
Figure 2.4: Three-party authentication model
only the database owner can verify the data.
The two-party authentication model can be extended to the three-party model by adding public
verifiability, which enables a third party to verify query results (Narasimha & Tsudik, 2006). The
public verifiability is facilitated through the use of public-key digital signature in which the public
key can be distributed to third parties to be used in the verification of the signature. Figure 2.4
illustrates the three-party authentication model.
Verifiable database is an integrity authentication model which uses the two-party or the three-
party authentication models in order to provide integrity assurance of outsourced data. The entities
involved in the verifiable database model are the database owner, the database service provider, and
database users. Although in practice the database owner can be represented by one or more entities,
for simplicity we will refer to him as a singular entity. The following definitions are important to
understand the verifiable database model:
Definition 2.1.4.1. Authentication Structure: an authentication structure is a special type of data
structures which is built based on a given data and used to authenticate the underlying data integrity.
Authentication structures are created and signed by the database owner and uploaded along with
data to the database service provider servers. Authentication structures use cryptographic primitives
such as digital signatures to ensure the authenticity of data. Merkle hash tree is a well known type
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of authentication structures which will be described in details in the next subsection.
Definition 2.1.4.2. Verification Process: the verification process is an integrity verification proce-
dure used by database users to verify the integrity of their query results. The integrity verification
process includes data correctness and data completeness verification.
Definition 2.1.4.3. Verification Object: the verification object is an object extracted from the au-
thentication structure of any given data and used to verify integrity of the queried part of that data.
The verification object helps to reconstruct the authentication structure at the side of database users
in order to verify the concerned data integrity.
2.1.5 Merkle Hash Tree (MHT)
Merkle hash tree, which was proposed by Merkle (1989), is a data structure used to authenti-
cate data. MHT data structure is a type of binary tree built based on a given set of data and used
to authenticate the underlying data. In MHT, each leaf node stores the hash of a data value of the
underlying data to be authenticated while each intermediate node stores the hash of the concatena-
tion of its two children nodes. Finally, the root node stores a digital signature of the hash of the
concatenations of its two children. To verify the authenticity of data, the tree can be recalculated
from the underlying data values recursively. The calculated root can be verified against the signed
root to detect any integrity violations (Li et al., 2006; Narasimha & Tsudik, 2005; Pang et al., 2009;
Wang et al., 2015). Figure 2.5 shows an example of MHT. In this example, given a dataset to be
authenticated which consists of data elements fd1; d2; d3; d4g, we follow the following steps to
create the MHT authentication structure:
 Use a secure cryptographic hash function such as SHA to create the leaf nodes of the tree. For
instance, the leaf node N1 concerned with data element d1 stores the hash digest h(d1).
 Recursively create intermediate nodes where each intermediate node stores a hash of concate-
nating the content of its two children nodes. For instance, the intermediate node N5 stores
the hash of concatenating its two children nodes h(N1jN2).
 When reaching the root node N7, hash the content of its two children nodes and sign it us-
ing a secure cryptographic public-key digital signature such as RSA. In the example, the
11
Figure 2.5: Example of MHT
root node N7 stores the signature of concatenating its two children nodes’ content N7 =
Sign(h(N5jN6)).
To authenticate data before consuming it, suppose a user queries the data and receives the data
element d1 as his query result set. To be able to reconstruct the tree, the user needs besides the
query result set a verification object including the nodes (N2; N6; N7). Next, the user can follow
the following steps to authenticate his query result before consuming it:
 Hash the query result d1 to create the leaf node N1 = h(d1).
 Using the obtained leaf node N1 and the leaf node N2 from the verification object, create the
intermediate node N5 = h(N1jN2).
 Using the obtained intermediate node N5 and the intermediate node N6 from the verification
object, create the root node N70 = h(N5jN6).
 Decrypt the node N7 from the verification object and verify that Decrypt(N7) = N70
2.1.6 Data Correctness and Data Completeness
The major security requirement of verifiable databases is to provide data correctness assurance.
Data correctness ensures the integrity and authenticity of the outsourced database. This means
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that when interacting with the data, a query result set must be proved authentic with respect to the
database owner. This proof implies that the data has not been tampered with in any an unauthorized
way (Narasimha & Tsudik, 2005; Wang et al., 2015; Yuan & Yu, 2013).
Another security requirement of verifiable databases is to provide data completeness assurance.
Data completeness ensures that a query result set is complete and that the database service provider
has not deleted any data from that database and has not omitted any data from the result set in any
an unauthorized way (Narasimha & Tsudik, 2005; Wang et al., 2015; Yuan & Yu, 2013).
It’s worth mentioning that providing data correctness does not necessarily guarantee data com-
pleteness. This is because the verifier uses the data itself as well as data from the verification object
in order to be able to perform the verification process. As a result, when deleting data in an unau-
thorized way from the database permanently or from the result set, the verifier can only verify the
integrity of the present data in the result set. Therefore, there has to be a mechanism to detect any
an unauthorized data deletion. These two security requirements must be analyzed and addressed
independently when designing a verifiable database model.
2.1.7 Game Theory and Stackelberg Game Theory
A game is any situation where individuals (players) interact and have a set of choices to choose
from. Thus, each player has partial control over the game through their actions (M’hamdi & Ben-
tahar, 2012). According to Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), ”Game theory is a bag of analytical
tools designed to help us understand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makers inter-
act. The basic assumptions that underlie the theory are that decision-makers pursue well-defined
exogenous objectives (they are rational) and take into account their knowledge or expectations of
other decision-makers’ behavior (they reason strategically)” (p. 1).
In general, a game consists of the following three main elements (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994):
(1) A set of P players where each player is referred to as pi.
(2) For every player pi, a set si of strategies. Thus a game consists of a set S of outcomes
where S = [s1  s2  s3::: sn].
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(3) For every player pi, a utility function Ui which determines player’s pi payoff and his prefer-
ence over the set of strategies S.
The following are a general concepts pertain to game theory:
Definition 2.1.7.1. Strategy: a strategy or a Pure Strategy is a set of actions where each action is a
response for a certain situation in a given game.
Definition 2.1.7.2. Mixed Strategy: a mixed strategy is a strategy that consists of a probability
distribution over the actions of a pure strategy which make it harder for the opponent to predict.
Definition 2.1.7.3. Nash Equilibrium: nash equilibrium represents players’ strategies that are mu-
tually best responses. No player would deviate from his choice even after learning about the other
player’s strategy.
Game theory classifies types of games into a number of classes based on different aspects. For
the purpose of this research, we are concerned with a class of games called Stackelberg games.
Stackelberg model was developed by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934 in the book titled ”Mar-
ket Structure and Equilibrium” (Von Stackelberg, 1934). When first appeared, it was purely an
economics model to represent the market competition between firms. The basic idea behind Stack-
elberg game theory is that a competition between firms can be characterized based on the fact that
certain firms has more control over the market while other firms has less control. The former is
called a leader as a result of being dominant in certain characteristics such as the size and reputa-
tion. The latter is called a follower which means that it has a limited influence on the concerned
market. Stackelberg game model analyzes and represents this phenomena and grants to the leader
firm an optimal strategy concerned with taking certain decision related to the market with respect to
the follower firm expected responses.
In security, Stackelberg game is used to model attacker-defender security problems (Korzhyk,
Conitzer, & Parr, 2010; Wahab, Bentahar, Otrok, & Mourad, 2016). In Stackelberg game, a leader
commits to a mixed strategy first, and then a follower optimizes his strategy in order to maximize
his reward (An, Tambe, Ordonez, Shieh, & Kiekintveld, 2011; Korzhyk et al., 2010; M’hamdi &
Bentahar, 2012; Paruchuri et al., 2008b). Although the leader has to move first and the follower gets
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to observe the leader strategy before choosing his strategy, the leader has the first mover advantage,
which guarantees a higher payoff for the leader (Wahab et al., 2016). To illustrate the benefit of
being a leader in a Stackelberg game, let us analyze a simple game with a payoff table as shown
in Table 2.1. This example game is a general example that has been used in a wide variety of
resources including (Korzhyk et al., 2010; M’hamdi & Bentahar, 2012; Paruchuri et al., 2008b;
Pita et al., 2008). The row player is the leader and the column player is the follower. There exists
only one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when the leader plays strategy A and the follower plays
strategy C. This gives the leader a payoff of 3. Although playing strategy B is strictly dominated
for the leader, the leader can receive a payoff of 4 if he can commit to playing strategy B before
the follower chooses. This is because the follower will always play strategy D to obtain a higher
payoff. However, if the leader can commit to a mixed strategy of playing A with (0.5) probability
and playing B with (0.5) probability, then the follower will always play strategy D which gives the
leader a payoff of 4.5 (Yin, Korzhyk, Kiekintveld, Conitzer, & Tambe, 2010).
Table 2.1: Example of a Payoff table
C D
A (3 , 2) (5 , 1)
B (2 , 1) (4 , 3)
Game theory uses mathematical representations to describe and solve games precisely (Osborne
& Rubinstein, 1994). For the course of our specific research problem, we will deal with representing
our game mathematically and solving it using linear programming techniques, which is defined as
a mathematical optimization method used to maximize or minimize a given function called the
objective function with respect to specific constraints and condition (M’hamdi & Bentahar, 2012).
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we survey the state of the art research related to the verifiable database ap-
proaches and we highlight the limitations associated with each approach. We conclude this section
by reviewing the use of Stackelberg game theory in security in the literature.
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2.2.1 Verifiable Database
There has been an ongoing substantial work on the verifiable database three-party model. In
this model, a database owner outsources his data management to an untrusted third-party service
provider on the cloud, who answers queries sent from database users on-behalf of the database
owner. Since the database is stored at an untrusted third-party, this model has to ensure detecting
any data integrity violation with outstanding probability (Goodrich et al., 2008; Papamanthou &
Tamassia, 2007; Wang et al., 2015). The current approaches to solve this research problem can be
categorized into three different classes:
Tree-based approaches: one popular tree-based approach is the Merkle hash tree (MHT) in-
troduced by Merkle (1989). In MHT, each leaf node contains a hash of the underlying data whereas
each intermediate node stores the hash of its two children nodes. Finally, the root node stores the
signed hash of its two children nodes. When verifying, the tree can be reconstructed bottom up
from the underlying data so that the reconstructed root can be verified against the stored signed
root. The first work that addressed the problem of verifiable database using MHT was proposed
by Devanbu, Gertz, Martel, and Stubblebine (2002). The MHT in this case is constructed over each
entire database table where each tuple represents a leaf node in the tree. When querying the data,
the database service provider responds to database users queries with the result set as well as a VO
containing the hash of all tuples in the table. The obvious drawback of this approach is the extremely
inefficient communications and computations overhead. Ma et al. (2005) Has developed a more ef-
ficient model called the attr-MHT by constructing MHT on individual tuples instead of the whole
table to reduce communication and processing overhead. In the attr-MHT, each attribute of a tuple
represents a leaf node in MHT and each signature corresponds to one tuple. When querying the
data, the database service provider respond to database uers’ queries with the result set along with
a VO containing the tree nodes of the attributes which is not included in the query result set. Other
remarkable work that reduced computation overhead used the sophisticated Merkle B-tree and the
Embedded Merkle B-tree (Li et al., 2006). The drawbacks of using the tree-based approaches are
the associated computation and communication overhead requirements (Wang et al., 2015). Fur-
thermore, these approaches have a limited support for sophisticated query types such as aggregated
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queries.
Probabilistic integrity verification approach: the idea behind this approach is that the database
owner inserts fake tuples into the database in different locations. Those tuples are used to verify the
integrity of data with certain probability (Xie et al., 2007). When querying the data, the database ser-
vice provider responds to database users’ queries with the result set. Database users then can check
for the fake tuples inserted that satisfies the query. If they find the expected fake tuples, database
users then can draw a certain probability that the data integrity has or has not been manipulated.
The drawbacks of this approach is that it requires storage overhead to store the fake tuples locally
and distribute it to all database users in order to be used later on in the verification process (Wang
et al., 2015). In addition, the number of fake tuples required to guarantee a certain probability as-
surance are linear to the size of the database. This renders this approach completely inefficient for
large-scale databases. Furthermore, the process of maintaining and identifying the fake tuples can
be extremely costly process from a computational stand point. Finally, we argue that the database
service provider is rational and he might has an interest in tuples that reflect a real entity. Thus, there
is a high chance that the fake tuples might not be of any interest to the database service provider. As
a result, a sensitive data integrity breach might go undetected while relying on this approach might
still indicate a high probability of valid data integrity. Those concerns affect both the correctness
and completeness of the underlying data.
Signature-based approach: in this approach, the database owner hashes and signs the con-
catenation of each tuple’s data and stores it along with the tuple at the database service provider
servers (Wang et al., 2015; Yang, Papadias, Papadopoulos, & Kalnis, 2009). Although this ap-
proach uses a much simpler authentication structure, the VO when querying a large database can
become inefficient from bandwidth and computations prospective. The database service provider
has to send along with every query a linear number n of signatures equals to the number of tuples in
the results set. In addition, this approach does not provide data completeness assurance. Mykletun,
Narasimha, and Tsudik (2006) have proposed an improved signature-based version using signature
aggregation. When querying the database in this approach, the signatures of multiple tuples are ag-
gregated into one signature to reduce communication and computation overhead (Pang et al., 2009).
As a result, the database service provider responds to users query with the result set as well as one
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aggregated digital signature for the whole result set. The aggregated signature has a size equals to
one single signature and can be verified only once for the whole result set instead of a verification
per each tuple. The limitation of the signature aggregation is that although it provides data cor-
rectness assurance, it lacks the assurance of data completeness. Narasimha and Tsudik (2006) have
proposed yet another improved version that uses signature aggregation and chaining to overcome
the completeness assurance limitation. The idea behind this version is that in a sorted database ta-
ble, each tuple is signed and its signature chained with the signature of its adjacent tuples. When
querying, the database service provider responds to range queries by chaining the signature of the
predecessor and successor tuples in the VO. This way, database users can verify that the result set is
complete and that the server has not omitted any results that satisfy the query. The drawback of this
approach is its complexity and inapplicability where for every tuple inserted, deleted, or updated,
the database service provider has to calculate the affected tuples signature with regard to the signa-
ture of its adjacent tuples. In addition, data completeness assurance here is provided based on the
assumption that the result set would contain some tuples in order to detect any omitted tuples. How-
ever, in practice, this might not be the case where the result set might be empty. Furthermore, since
the verification process works by authenticating individual tuples based on their signatures chaining
with the signatures of adjacent tuples, this approach is only useful when using range queries that
retrieve all tuples in that range. Otherwise, every distinct tuples’ signature must be accompanied
with its adjacent tuples’ signatures which can be an extremely expensive process specially when
dealing with large databases.











Tree-based High Not supported Average Supported Not supported
Probabilistic
integrity verification
. High Supported Low Supported Not supported
Signature-based High Not supported Average Supported Supported
Most of the previous verifiable database approaches require that database users have to verify
every single query in order to ensure data integrity. As a result, the verification process is highly
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expensive for computationally weak clients. Furthermore, since database users only verify the data
that they are querying, we argue that this model presents a security concern where any integrity
violation in data that is not being queried might go undetected for a long time. Table 2.2 summarizes
the limitations of current VDB approaches. On the other hand, there is a recent work proposed
by Zhu et al. (2013) that has molded the problem of outsourced storage in a way similar to our
work. In their work, the authors have concluded that it is crucial to use periodic verifications in
order to eliminate the processing and communication overhead incurred by current VDB models.
Their model was designed to verify the integrity of memory blocks and provides general storage
verifiability not specific to the problem of outsourced database. Moreover, unlike our approach that
uses game theory to randomize verifications, their approach uses a random sampling audit, and we
will show in Chapter 4 that our approach outperforms the uniform randomization.
2.2.2 Stackelberg Game Theory in Security
Game Theory has become a popular methodology for solving sophisticated security scheduling
and patrolling problems (An et al., 2011; Wahab et al., 2016). Stackelberg game is used to model
attacker-defender security problems (Korzhyk et al., 2010; Wahab et al., 2016).
Pita et al. (2008) have used Stackelberg game theory to model the security problem police offi-
cers face at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)(Paruchuri et al., 2008b; Wahab et al., 2016).
In these settings, the police have a number of routes (targets), which lead to different sensitive loca-
tions, and a limited number of resources (checkpoints and canine unites) to cover those routes. Tak-
ing into consideration this limitation of the number of resources available and the uncertainty about
the attacker types faced as well as the observability of the police strategy, authors have modeled the
security problem at LAX as a Bayesian Stackelberg security game to randomize the assignment of
resources to effectively cover targets.
In M’hamdi and Bentahar (2012) work, the authors have used Stackelberg game theory to sched-
ule reputation maintenance in agent-based communities. In these settings, an agent-based commu-
nity consists of rational community members who have the incentive to interact and provide services
for each other, for other communities, or for end users. In addition, for each community, there ex-
ists a controller agent, who is responsible for maintaining the community reputation to attract other
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agents to the community. The controller agent has to perform a reputation maintenance check ran-
domly to ensure that community members are acting truthfully. After each maintenance check,
the community member reputation is updated and might receive a reward or a punishment. The
problem of this model is that it is not feasible to perform the maintenance checks at all times. In
addition, there are uncertainty about the community member faced. Authors have modeled this se-




Game Theocratic Model Design1
This Chapter introduces problem definition and the proposed model design first, which is based
on Stackelberg game theory. Second, we will present the game theoretic analysis of the proposed
solution. Finally, we will discuss how to find the optimal mixed strategy of the verifier.
3.1 Problem Definition
As mentioned in Chapter 2, most of current verifiable database model problems are a result of
mixing the concerns between the entities involved in the model. In current models in the literature,
after the database owner creates and uploads the authentication structure of the database, database
users are responsible for carrying out the verification process themselves. This mixing of concerns
adds the following complexities to the verifiable database model:
(1) Resource-constraint database users might not be capable of performing the expensive verifi-
cation processes which may include a large number of sophisticated decryption processes.
(2) The sophisticated authentication structures associated with the verifiable database model af-
fect the practicality when used with conjunction with complex database users’ queries such
as the aggregated queries. In practice, most of the current verifiable database models do not
support such types of queries.
1the content of this chapter has been accepted for publication in the proceedings of The 32nd ACM Symposium on
Applied Computing Conference
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(3) Form extensibility and maintainability prospectives, this mixing of concerns adds up to the
complexity of the underlying systems and makes them much harder to extend and maintain.
(4) The presence of this mixing of concerns limits the choices of the authentication structures
applicable in order to provide an adequate level of security assurance. For instance, to pro-
vide data completeness assurance, current verifiable database models has to use sophisticated
authentication structures.
(5) From a security prospective, database users only verify the data that they query. This means if
any unused data was manipulated, this manipulation can go undetected for a long time which
makes it harder to roll back to the authentic version of data.
In our design, we aim to mainly address the mixing of concerns by introducing a logical sepa-
ration of concerns. To meet this requirement, the proposed model revokes the responsibility of the
verification process from database users and assigns it to an independent entity called the verifier as
will be described in the next section. The verifier, who is a trusted party to the database owner, will
be responsible for carrying out a periodic verifications to insure the integrity of data. Furthermore,
the interaction between the verifier and the database service provider will be analyzed and modeled
using Stackelberg game theory and solved mathematically using linear programming.
3.2 Model Design
The proposed model is designed as Stackelberg security game. The decision to model the VDB
problem as Stackelberg game is based on the wide use of this type of game to model attacker-
defender security problems. For instance, it’s been proven in (Pita et al., 2008) that modeling
security problems as a Stackelberg game guarantees an optimal patrolling strategy to the defender
which translates to an optimal payoff. This attacker-defender scenario is perfectly applicable to
the VDB model where the verifier schedules periodic verifications to detect any violations from
the database service provider. Our model includes the following four entities: the database owner,
database users, the database service provider, and the verifier. The database owner is responsible
for creating the database special authentication structure, which is stored along with the database at
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Figure 3.1: Proposed VDB model using Stackelberg game theory
the database service provider servers. The database service provider is responsible for hosting the
database and providing access to the authorized database users. In addition, some of the processing
required for this model is performed at the database service provider side. Finally, the verifier is
a software component running scheduled verifications on-behalf of the database owner as shown
in Figure 3.1. The game is mainly played between the verifier (leader) and the database service
provider (follower). First, the verifier runs Stackelberg solver algorithm to find the optimal mixed
strategy to commit to. Among the two most efficient Stackelberg solver algorithms existent to
date, we have chosen DOBSS (Paruchuri et al., 2008a) as it was proven in (Paruchuri et al., 2008a,
2008b) to be superior to its competitive ASAP. The mixed strategy in the proposed model includes
for every table in the database its probability of being verified. Experimental results showed that
DOBSS was significantly faster than ASAP in solving complex problems. Next, the verifier runs
a uniform randomization method in order to randomize n number of time slots. Finally, for every
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Figure 3.2: Flowchart of the verifier scheduling problem
random time slot, the verifier uses the previously obtained mixed strategy to determine which table
to verify at that particular time. Figure 3.2 shows the flowchart of steps involved to solve the verifier
scheduling problem.
3.3 Game Theoretic Analysis
As mentioned previously, the game is played between the verifier (leader) and the database
service provider (follower). In order to find the optimal mixed strategy of the verifier to commit to,
the first step is to analyze the game and construct its payoff matrix. The payoff matrix determines for
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each player in the game the reward (r) / penalty (p) resulted from players’ actions. In addition, the
proposed model ranks each table based on the tables’ data sensitivity (tds). This rank is realistic
since different tables have different data sensitivity levels. For instance, a table that stores credit
cards information has more value than a table that stores country names. Thus, sensitive data tables
should be verified more often than tables having less data sensitivity rank. We use (tds) to construct
the a logical payoff matrix of the game where every player’s reward/penalty is proportional to the
table being verified/manipulated. For instance, if the database service provider manipulates a table
with highly sensitive data, his reward/penalty will be high. It’s worth mentioning that the payoff
formulation we used to characterize the VDB model is driven by our game-theoretic analysis. The
following are the possible outcomes of the game:
 Data manipulation detected: this is the case where the verifier verifies certain table ti and
detects data integrity violation. As a result, the verifier receives a payoff of (r  tdsi), which
is a reward that is proportional to the table data sensitivity. On the other hand, the database
service provider receives a negative payoff of ( p tdsi).
 Data manipulation undetected: this is the case where the database service provider manipulates
data in a certain table ti and the verifier either verifies another table or does not perform
verification at all. As a result, the verifier receives a penalty of ( p tdsi) while the database
service provider receives a reward of (r  tdsi).
 Successful verification: this is the case where the verifier performs verification while there was
no data manipulation performed by the database service provider. As a result, the verifier
receives a payoff of small negative negligible value c, which is the computational power con-
sumed to perform the verification. On the other hand, the database service provider receives
a payoff of 0.
 Neutral situation: in this case, the verifier does not perform verification and there was no data
manipulation performed by the database service provider. As a result, both players of the
game receive a payoff of 0.
Table 3.1 shows the strategy profile and payoff matrix of the game for a certain table ti. The row
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player is the verifier whereas the column player is the database service provider.
Table 3.1: Strategy profile and payoff matrix of the game
Manipulate Not
Verify ((r  tdsi), ( p tdsi)) ( c, 0)
Not (( p tdsi), (r  tdsi)) (0, 0)
Table 3.2 presents an example of a game. For simplicity, we assume that only three tables
exist in the database. The row player is the verifier while the column player is the database service
provider. For every table in the database, the solution suggests the optimal mixed strategy S for the
verifier to commit to taking into account the optimal strategy Q of the database service provider.
Table 3.2: Example of a game
Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 S
Table 1 (4.5 , -4.5 )     45%
Table 2   ( 4.5, -4.5)   45%
Table 3     (0.4, -0.4 ) 10%
Q 1 1 0
3.4 Finding the Verifier Optimal Mixed Strategy
To solve the problem mathematically, we will use the Stackelberg solver algorithm DOBSS
(Refer to Paruchuri et al. (2008b) work for more information about DOBSS solver algorithm). The
general methodology in this Chapter was inspired by the methodology used by Paruchuri et al.
(2008b) and by Pita et al. (2008). However, our work uses its independent analysis and design
special to the verifiable outsourced database model. We will start by defining the game as a mixed-
integer quadratic program (MIQP). Then, we will transform the MIQP into a Mixed-Integer Linear
Program (MILP) equivalent. Finally, we will solve the MILP problem using a linear programming
solver tool.
Given a time interval, there exists a number of discrete moments in which the verifier has to
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play. In each individual moment, the verifier can either choose to verify (strategy 1) certain table or
not (strategy 0). Similarly, there exists a discrete number of moments where the database service
provider has to play. The database service provider can choose to either act maliciously (strategy 1)
or act truthfully (strategy 0).
We denote by T and TDS the index set of database tables’ names and its corresponding data
sensitivity respectively. Thus, ti and tdsi are the individual table tablei and its corresponding data
sensitivity rank respectively. We also denote byQ the index set of the database service provider pure
strategies. qj is the strategy chosen by the database service provider for the table j, which represents
either the database service provider manipulates table j or not. Thus, qj 2 f0, 1g. We denote by S
the verifier policy (mixed strategy), which consists of a vector of probability distribution over the
set of tables. si is the probability of verifying table i. Thus, si 2 (0. . . 1]. We also denote by R
and C the payoff matrices of the verifier and the database service provider respectively. Rij and C ij
are the verifier and database service provider reward respectively when the verifier plays strategy si
and the database service provider plays strategy qj.
To obtain the optimal mixed strategy, the verifier has to use the backward induction to optimize
his strategy based on the database service provider optimal strategy. Consequently, by fixing si, the
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Cij (1  si)  0 8j 2 T (5)
By embedding Equations 4 and 5 as constraints in the verifier optimization problem, the verifier has






















Cij (1  si)  0 8j 2 T
si 2 (0 : : : 1] 8i 2 T
qj 2 f0; 1g 8j 2 T
(6)
The objective function generates the optimal mixed strategy S that maximizes the verifier total
payoff. The first and sixth constraints limit the mixed strategy to be a probability distribution over
the set of tables. The second and seventh constraints ensure that the follower strategy is a pure
strategy. The third and fourth constraints are used to consider the follower optimal strategy.
The next step is to linearize the MIQP obtained in Optimization Problem 6 by replacing the
variables Z ij = si  qj which will generate the following DOBSS equivalent MILP that can be
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This Chapter covers the implementation settings and evaluation of the system. The first section
introduces the overall system architecture, and main interface functionalities. In addition, the first
section shows how the game matrix is constructed and solved in order to obtain the mixed strategy
and defines the transformation from a mixed strategy to verification schedule as well as covering
different aspects of the verification process. In the second section, we evaluate the security, Stack-
elberg game scheduling performance, and the efficiency of the proposed model.
4.1 Implementation
In this section, we start by introducing the implemented system architecture and design. We
conclude this section by presenting the different implementation settings of the main components
of the implemented system.
4.1.1 System Architecture
The implemented system consists of two main components, the database owner component
and the verifier component. The verifier component is of more importance in the course of this
research because it involves the Stackelberg game. There is no direct interaction between these two
components except when initially delivering the public key from the database owner to the verifier
to be used in the verification process. In addition, when the verifier component detects data integrity
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violation, it may report the incident to the database owner automatically if required.
The database owner component is responsible for creating and uploading the authentication
structure to the database service provider which is integrated to the business logic of the actual sys-
tem. Once the initial database and its authentication structure are uploaded to the database service
provider servers, the database owner component updates the authentication structure associated with
any inserted, updated, or deleted tuples and its correspondent database tables.
The verifier component consists of a front-end, a business logic, and a back-end. The front-end
is designed to provide user interface for input and for tracking the current verification session status.
The business logic provides the required computations to construct and solve the Stackelberg game
as well as performing the verifications accordingly. The back-end is used to store the settings of the
system and the history of sessions results.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the flow chart and steps involved in the verifier scheduling problem. The
system user, who is responsible for administering the developed system, interacts with system inter-
face to set the input which consists of the target database address, the Stackelberg game input, and
the number of verification schedule time slots to be randomized by the system. Once the system
users specifies the target database address to be verified, the system reads the schema of the target
database and enables the system user to enter the Stackelberg game input which is a sensitivity value
assigned to every database table in the target database that will be used to construct the game matrix.
Next, the system calculates the optimal mixed strategy for the verifier to commit to. Fianlly, when
the system user runs the session, at every randomized time slot, the system uses the mixed strategy
to identify a random table to verify and proceeds with the verification process. The pseudo code
shown in Algorithm 1 describes the steps involved to solve the verifier scheduling problem.
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Figure 4.1: Dataflow and steps involved in the verifier component
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code of the verifier scheduling problem
Require: The game matrix, DOBSS representation, the number of time slots n
1: Find the verifier mixed strategy S by solving the Optimization Problem 7
2: Create a vector V of n randomized time slots using uniform randomization
3: for j = 0! (jVj   1) do
4: For time slot j, find what table t to verify using S
5: Verify table t using the overall-table verification process (Section 4.1.6)
6: if (t integrity is violated) then
7: Identify individual affected records using the in-depth verification process (Section 4.1.6)





The interface consists mainly of three columns as shown in Figure 4.2 The first column provides
controls that allow the system user to specify a verification session of any number of days and a
number of verifications time slots per day. Next, the system randomizes the verifications time slot
for each day. The obtained session days and time slots are displayed in the list box underneath. The
second column provides controls that allow the system user to specify the target database path in
order to read the database schema. After reading the target database schema, the interface provides
a pop-up window, which displays every table name in the database schema and enables the user
to set the data sensitivity for each table. Finally, the interface enables the user to automatically
construct and solve the Stackelberg game. The obtained optimal mixed strategy is displayed in the
list box underneath. The third column is used to run and track the session as previously specified.
The results of every verification is displayed in the list box underneath and stored in the back-end
database.
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Figure 4.2: System interface
4.1.3 Matrix Construction and Mixed Strategy Generation
Given the database schema and user input of every table data sensitivity, the system constructs
the payoff matrix of the game. Next, this payoff matrix is used by DOBSS solver algorithm in
order to calculate the verifier optimal mixed strategy. The obtained mixed strategy specifies for
every table its probability of being verified by the verifier. The obtained mixed strategy grants the
maximum payoff for the verifier. After obtaining the mixed strategy from the previous step, and at
every verification time slot, the system sends the mixed strategy to a method that chooses one table
randomly according to the specified mixed strategy. It is worth mentioning that the mixed strategy
is generated only once. Then the verifier has to commit to that mixed strategy.
4.1.4 From Mixed Strategy to The Verification Schedule
The verification schedule maps every verification process to a certain table in the target database
to be verified. Verification moments are chosen randomly using uniform randomization within the
predefined period and the number of verification time slots specified by the system user. At every
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Figure 4.3: Mixed strategy to verification schedule
verification moment, the system uses the optimal mixed strategy in order to choose a table to verify
with probability according to the mixed strategy. To illustrate the point, suppose that we have two
balls in a dark box. One ball is red and the other is blue. If we grasp a ball at random, there is
a 50% probability that we choose a ball with either color. Now what happens if we put three blue
balls and one red ball in that box. When grasping a ball at random, there is a 75% probability of
ending up with a blue ball and a 25% probability of ending up with a red ball. We have used the
same concept when transforming from the mixed strategy to the verification schedule. According
to the probability assigned to every table in the mixed strategy, we construct an array of the tables
where every table is inserted a number of times proportional to its probability in the mixed strategy.
For instance, if the obtained mixed strategy is verifying table1 with probability of 75% and table2
with probability of 25%, we insert into the array three instances of table1 while only one instance
of table2 is inserted. Finally, a random index of the array is chosen and we end up with a table to
verify chosen randomly with probability according to the mixed strategy as shown in Figure 4.3.
4.1.5 Authentication Structure Creation
Before the verification can be carried out, the database owner has to upload to the database
service provider the authentication structure along with the database. The authentication structure
in our case is signature based and it is of two types called table-based authentication structure and
tuple-based authentication.
The table-based authentication structure is implemented by signing the hash of concatenation
of each table data. The resulted table-based signature is saved in a special table dedicated to storing
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the names of the target database tables and its correspondent signatures. The verifier then can access
this special table to fetch the signature associated with any table undergoing the verification process.
The tuple-based authentication is implemented by signing the hash of the concatenation of each
tuple data. The resulted tuple-based authentication structure is stored inside the table of the con-
cerned tuple. Every tuple signature is added to the concerned tuple in a new column dedicated for
storing its signature.
Unlike the tuple-based authentication structure, which provides only integrity assurance, table-
based authentication structure provides both integrity and completeness assurance. Moreover, using
these two different signing processes saves a great deal of communications and computations over-
head as will be illustrated in the next section.
4.1.6 The Verification Process
The verification process consists of two stages, the overall-table verification stage and the
in-depth table verification stage. The former stage uses the table-based authentication structure
whereas the latter stage uses the tuple-based authentication structure.
The overall-table verification stage is the initial verification process. Since it uses the table-
based authentication structure, it involves only one communication to the database service provider
server and one signature verification operation. Therefore, it’s very efficient to employ as the first
verification stage only to find out if any integrity violation (data correctness and data completeness)
exists in the verified table. If there was no data integrity violation detected, there is no need to
proceed to the comparably computationally expensive in-depth verification stage. This verification
stage provides data correctness and data completeness assurance.
The in-depth table verification stage is the second verification stage. It’s only activated when
there is data integrity violation detected in a certain table from the initial overall-table verification
stage. Since the in-depth table verification stage uses the tuple-based authentication structure, its
use is to identify the specific individual affected tuples by the integrity violation.
Figure 4.4 shows the detailed flow chart diagram of the verifier component including all the
processes.
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Figure 4.4: Detailed flow chart of the verifier component
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4.2 Evaluation
In this section, we start by performing theocratic security analysis of the implemented system.
Next, we evaluate the Stackelberg scheduling effectiveness by comparing our implemented system
performance against a uniform randomization verification model. Finally, we evaluate and summa-
rize the efficiency of our model against different cost metrics.
4.2.1 Security Analysis
The proposed model has to provide two security requirements. First, it has to ensure that data
in the target database has not been tampered with. Second, it has to ensure that no data in the target
database has been deleted in any an unauthorized way.
Remark 1. The proposed model provides data integrity assurance
Justification 1. Since the proposed model uses a digital signature to sign the two different authen-
tication structures used by the model, and assuming that the used digital signature is secure enough
and that the private key is kept secure, no one other than the authorized parties (who have the
private key) can alter the signed data without being detected. Assume that table x has the content
m. Therefore, the table based authentication structure constructed by the proposed model will be
Sign(h(m)). As a result, if table x content was altered to be m0 where m 6= m0, the verification
process will yield that Decrypt(h(m)) 6= h(m0). Thus, the verification will fail and the manipula-
tion will be detected.
Remark 2. The proposed model provides data completeness assurance
Justification 2. Since the proposed model uses the table-based authentication structure, which signs
the hash of concatenation of the whole table data, and assuming that the used digital signature
is secure enough and that the private key is kept secure, any data deletion performed by any an
unauthorized party will be detected when verifying the manipulated table. Assume that table x has
the content m. Therefore, the table based authentication structure constructed by the proposed
model will be Sign(h(m)). As a result, if some or all of table x content was deleted to be mz
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where m 6= mz, the verification process will yield that Decrypt(h(m)) 6= h(m   z). Thus, the
verification will fail and the manipulation will be detected.
4.2.2 Stackelberg Scheduling Evaluation
In addition to the security proof, we need to evaluate the Stackelberg verification scheduling
effectiveness of the proposed model. In the literature, Stackelberg-based randomization is usually
compared to the uniform randomization regardless of the fields the randomization is applied to, and
since our proposed VDB model’s design is considerably different than any VDB model design in
the literature, we will compare the effectiveness of our model’s Stackelberg-based randomization
against a uniform randomization model. We have simulated a malicious database service provider
and we ran the proposed model against a model that uses a uniform randomization. In these settings,
we have set a database of 20 tables hosted at the simulated malicious database service provider side.
Each table contains 50; 000 tuples. The simulated malicious database service provider each time
manipulates some tables based on his optimization function. The different settings of each test and
its average results are presented next.
Figure 4.5 shows the average number of verifications required by each model to detect a ma-
nipulation of one table at a time for 10 runs. The x-axis enumerates the manipulations performed
by the malicious database service provider whereas the y-axis represents the average number of
verifications needed for each model to detect the integrity violation. The results clearly show that
our model outperforms the uniform randomization model. Average verifications performed ranged
between 2 and 9 for our model whereas the uniform randomization model required from 6 to 32
verifications before detecting the integrity violation.
Figure 4.6 shows the average number of detections achieved by each model when limiting the
number of verifications to 10. The x-axis enumerates the manipulations performed by the malicious
database service provider while the y-axis represents the average number of detections recorded by
each model. The results show that our model detected the integrity violation between 1 and 3 times
whereas the uniform randomization detections ranged between 0 (in runs 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10) and
1 detection.
Figure 4.7 shows the average number of detections achieved by each model when running both
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Figure 4.5: Averge number of verifications performed by each model
























Figure 4.6: Average number of detections over 10 verifications
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Figure 4.7: Average number of detections over 10 verification time slots
models with unlimited number of verifications for 10 time slots each of 30 seconds. The x-axis
enumerates the time slots while the y-axis represents the average number of detections recorded by
each model. The results show that the proposed model clearly outperformed the uniform random-
ization model with average number of detections amounted to six times greater than the uniform
randomization model.
Figure 4.8 shows the average number of verifications performed by each model to detect all the
manipulations when manipulating one or more tables. The x-axis represents the number of tables
manipulated while the y-axis represents the average number of verifications performed before de-
tecting all the manipulations. The results clearly show that our model took less verification attempts
to detect the manipulations even when manipulating multiple tables at once.
Figure 4.9 shows the average time in seconds it took each model to detect all the manipulations
when manipulating one or more tables. The x-axis represents the number of tables manipulated
while the y-axis represents the average time elapsed before detecting all the manipulations by each
model. The results clearly show that our model was faster to detect the manipulations even when
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Figure 4.8: Average number of verifications required to detect multiple tables manipulations
manipulating multiple tables at once.
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Figure 4.9: Average time required to detect multiple table manipulations
4.2.3 Efficiency Analysis
We first identify the cost of the different processes involved in the proposed model. Then we
present an analysis of the processing The three main contributions of our proposed model greatly
improve the efficiency of the VDB model. First, employing the periodic verifications saves a great
deal of computation and communication overhead. Second, delegating the verification task respon-
sibility to the verifier entity not only provides a logical separation of concerns, but also enables
the proposed model to support all query types since database users are not involved in the process
unlike most of the models in the literature. Third, the two stage verification process introduced
in our model considerably reduces the required number of hash and digital signature operations.
Thanks to the table-based authentication structure, the verifier needs not to activate the expensive
in-depth verification stage except when detecting an integrity violation in a certain table using the
overall-table verification stage.
Next, we first identify the cost of the different processes involved in the proposed model. Then
we present an analysis of the processing and communication cost required at the side of each party
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involved for verifying both the integrity and completeness of the database.
There are two main processes in the proposed model. The first process is the creation of the
authentication structure whereas the second process is the verification process. The processing cost
of creating the table-based authentication structure is one hash operation and one signature operation
per table. On the other hand, the processing cost of creating the tuple-based authentication structure
is one hash operation and one signature operation per tuple. Similarly, the processing cost of the
overall-table verification stage is one hash and one decryption (verifying the signature) per table.
Likewise, the processing cost of the in-depth table verification stage is one hash and one decryption
per each tuple in a table. The following is the processing and communication cost analysis incurred
at each party involved in the proposed model:
 Database owner: for each data insertion process, the database owner has to perform one hash
operation and one signature operation per each inserted tuple in order to create the tuple-based
authentication structure and upload it along with the inserted tuples. In addition, the database
owner incurs one communication to the database service provider and one signature opera-
tion in order to create the table-based authentication structure. The hash of the table-based
authentication structure is performed at the database service provider side. Similarly, the up-
date process involves one communication to the database service provider and one signature
operation in order to update the affected tuples’ authentication structure. Furthermore, the
database owner incur one communication and one signature to update the table-based authen-
tication structure. Finally, for each deletion operation, the database owner has to update only
the table-based authentication structure, which involves one communication and one signa-
ture operation performed at the database owner side. Table 4.1 summarizes the costs incurred
at the database owner side.
 The database service provider: the database service provider is involved in calculating the
hash digest to be sent to the database owner for signing or to the verifier to be used in the
verification process. These operations are performed particularly by the relational database
management system using the transactional structured query language T-SQL. Furthermore,
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Insertion Tuple-based AS creation 0 1=tuple 1=tuple
Table-based AS creation 1 0 1=table
Update Tuple-based AS creation 1 0 1=tuple
Table-based AS creation 1 0 1=table
Deletion Tuple-based AS creation 0 0 0
Table-based AS creation 1 0 1=table
the database service provider processes digital signature aggregation of multiple tuples signa-
tures to reduce the communication and computation overhead when the in-depth verification
is performed.
 Database users: Database users in the proposed model have no role in the verification process.
 The verifier: the overall-table verification stage involves one communication and one decryption
operation per table. On the other hand, the in-depth verification stage involves one commu-
nication per table and one decryption operation per tuple for all tuples in a table. The hash
operations are performed at the database service provider to reduce communication and com-
putation overhead. Table 4.2 summarizes the costs incurred at the database owner side.





The over-all table verification 1 1=table
The in-depth table verification 1 1=tuple
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Contributions
In this research, we have proposed a practical verifiable outsourced database model using Stack-
elberg game theory. To our knowledge, this is the first work that employs a game theoretic approach
to address the integrity concerns of outsourced databases. The implementation of game theory in
the problem of the verifiable database significantly improved the practicality and flexibility of the
model. First, the Stackelberg game theoretic approach in our proposed model enabled effective
periodic verifications scheduling to reduce the computation and communication costs. Second, it
noticeably improved the verifiable database model design by providing a well separation of con-
cerns implementation. To illustrate, the verification is performed by an independent entity called
the verifier instead of it being performed by database users. This has improved the model’s prac-
ticality and flexibility by supporting all query types including the sophisticated ones such as the
aggregated queries. Finally, the security level provided by proposed model is improved by perform-
ing the verification process over the whole data instead of only verifying the queried data as was the
case in the previous models in the literature.
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5.2 Future Work
For future work, the verification scheduling effectiveness can be improved further by dynami-
cally analyzing the previous verification sessions history using suitable machine learning algorithms
in order to update the game input, which could result in optimally adapting the mixed strategy ob-
tained for different unforeseen attacker types.
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